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WHO’S LEFT STANDING FOR STATE 
SOVEREIGNTY?: PRIVATE PARTY 
STANDING TO RAISE TENTH  
AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
Abstract: Although the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has reaf-
firmed the substantive force of the Tenth Amendment, it has not resolved 
the fundamental question of who has standing to raise claims under the 
Amendment. The Court’s reticence on the matter has sparked a rapidly 
intensifying split between those U.S. courts of appeals that allow private 
parties to raise claims under the Tenth Amendment and those—currently 
the majority—that allow only states to raise Tenth Amendment claims. 
This Note argues that circuit courts denying private parties standing er-
roneously rely on dicta from the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Ten-
nessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, and that other Supreme 
Court precedent implicitly recognizes private party Tenth Amendment 
standing. Because recent Supreme Court Tenth Amendment jurispru-
dence, along with the history and text of the Tenth Amendment, indicate 
that the Amendment safeguards an individual right, this Note concludes 
that private parties should be able to assert Tenth Amendment claims 
whenever they demonstrate distinct, personal harm and satisfy other tra-
ditional standing requirements. 
Introduction 
 Consider a situation where Congress passes legislation forbidding 
individuals convicted of certain crimes from carrying firearms.1 As a 
result, a local police chief in a small town a thousand miles away finds 
himself forced to fire a veteran officer of twenty years because she has 
an arrest record for committing an assault thirty years earlier.2 The as-
sault conviction is covered by the federal legislation, and the officer 
cannot perform her duties without carrying a firearm.3 The officer 
complains that the federal government has infringed upon the state’s 
right to manage its own police department and militia, and thus vio-
                                                                                                                      
1 In 1999 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided a case, Gillespie v. 
City of Indianapolis, resembling the facts of this hypothetical. See 185 F.3d 693, 697–98 (7th 
Cir. 1999). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
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lated the Tenth Amendment.4 The police chief similarly complains un-
der the same Amendment that the federal government has comman-
deered his office by requiring him to enforce the Act and dictating the 
make-up of his police force.5 The state attorney general, however, sup-
ports the federal legislation and says that the state has no objection to 
the law.6 Which of these parties has standing to have a complaint heard 
before the courts is a question that has plagued the U.S. courts of ap-
peals for decades.7 
 For over 200 years, the Tenth Amendment has stood as a bulwark, 
alternately nominal and substantive, protecting the states and their citi-
zens against encroachment by the federal government.8 The Tenth 
Amendment succinctly prescribes that, “The powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”9 In the dec-
ades since its adoption, American courts have vigorously debated the 
substantive meaning of this Amendment,10 and more fundamentally, 
                                                                                                                      
4 See id. The militia claim is derived from the fact that as a local police officer, the offi-
cer is subject to being called to service in the National Guard, the state’s “militia.” See id. at 
697. 
5 See id. at 697–98; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904 (1997) (granting 
standing, implicitly, to local chief law enforcement officers (“CLEOs”) to challenge a fed-
eral act for commandeering their office in violation of the Tenth Amendment). 
6 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703. 
7 See id.; see also infra notes 123–223 and accompanying text. In Gillespie, the police offi-
cer was granted standing to bring his Tenth Amendment claim. See 185 F.3d at 703. The 
current majority of circuit courts, however, would deny such standing. See infra notes 160–
215 and accompanying text. The U.S. Supreme Court, in its 1997 decision in Printz v. 
United States, implicitly recognized CLEOs’ standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim 
over being “impressed” into federal service, although there the states did not oppose the 
CLEOs’ position. See 521 U.S. at 904, 933. 
8See U.S. Const. amend. X; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992); 
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 275–
76 (1918); Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies 313 (3d 
ed. 2006). Supreme Court decisions have identified three main values of federalism, which 
the Tenth Amendment protects: (1) decreasing the likelihood of federal tyranny; (2) en-
hancing democracy by providing government that is closer to the people; and (3) as first 
articulated by Justice Brandeis, allowing states to function as laboratories for new ideas. See 
Chemerinsky, supra, at 313–15 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Lieberman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 
(1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
9 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
10 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991); Hammer, 247 U.S. at 275–76; Gib-
bons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196–97, 206 (1824). One major point of contention surrounds 
the question of whether it is the judiciary’s role to enforce the Tenth Amendment as a 
substantive limit on the power of Congress. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 316. Al-
though some legal theorists argue that states’ Tenth Amendment interests are represented 
in the national political process, others respond that the national political process protects 
only national voter interests, not those related to state or local governments. Id.; see also 
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who may enforce it.11 This latter question has recently pitted the circuit 
courts in a sharp, rapidly crystallizing disagreement.12 Six circuit courts 
of appeals now hold the increasingly popular majority position that 
only states and not private parties may enforce the Tenth Amend-
ment.13 Two circuit courts of appeals hold the once-majority position 
that private party standing to assert claims under the Tenth Amend-
ment is permissible.14 Further muddying the waters, even the circuit 
courts rejecting private party Tenth Amendment standing disagree over 
whether to grant an exception for private parties who bring a claim that 
aligns with state interests.15 
 The U.S. Supreme Court in recent years has made apparent that it 
will utilize the Tenth Amendment to restrict the power of the federal 
government,16 but it has left in place a vague and contradictory prece-
dent regarding private party standing under the Amendment.17 Given 
the resurgence of the Tenth Amendment as a substantive force in 
                                                                                                                      
Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 46 Vill. L. 
Rev. 951, 952 (2001) (asserting that the judiciary should enforce federalism principles); 
Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition 
and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543, 588 (1954) (arguing that 
Congress—through the political process—is the branch entrusted with safeguarding fed-
eralism principles). This latter argument has had increasing intuitive appeal in the mod-
ern age when national elections focus on national issues and senators are elected by popu-
lar vote and no longer directly chosen by the states. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 316. 
11 See United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004); Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 
703; see also infra notes 123–223 and accompanying text. 
12 Compare United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 09-1227), and United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 
522, 526 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 302 (2009), and Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 
F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005), with Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703. 
13 Those courts are the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, Eighth, 
Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Bond, 581 F.3d at 137; Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526; Oregon v. Legal 
Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal 
Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 2006); Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34; Mountain States 
Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980). 
14 Those courts are the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. 
Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703; Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 
n.16 (11th Cir. 1982). 
15 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137–38; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34; Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284–85. 
16 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157, 175; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457–58. 
17 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933 (granting standing, implicitly, to chief local law en-
forcement officers); Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939) 
(making the ambiguous statement that absent state officers, the private party appellants 
bringing the claim lacked standing); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) 
(granting standing implicitly). 
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American law,18 deciding who may invoke the Amendment has become 
increasingly important. The time is ripe for a Supreme Court ruling to 
stop the splintering of the circuits and definitively decide private party 
standing under the Tenth Amendment.19 
 The circuit courts in the majority position have uniformly cited the 
Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority (“TVA”)20 as binding precedent prohibiting private party 
Tenth Amendment standing.21 Yet the circuit courts in the minority 
position have persuasively reasoned that standing principles and Su-
preme Court precedent, including TVA, do not foreclose private party 
Tenth Amendment standing.22 Other Supreme Court precedent on the 
question of Tenth Amendment standing implicitly supports this minor-
ity position, as do foundational principles of judicial review and stand-
ing.23 Even some of the circuit courts in the majority position have im-
plicitly questioned the binding power of TVA’s language.24 Additionally, 
modern Tenth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence, along with 
scholarly opinion, not only has reaffirmed the substantive role of the 
Tenth Amendment, but also has delineated its specific protection of 
individual rights.25 Accordingly, this Note argues that private parties are 
potentially invoking their own rights when bringing a Tenth Amend-
ment claim, making them the correct parties to bring the claim and 
worthy of standing.26 With the Tenth Amendment guaranteeing indi-
vidual rights, private parties raising Tenth Amendment claims should 
not be barred as bringing generalized grievances or as violating the 
third-party standing bar, but instead should be granted standing once 
particular personal harm is demonstrated.27 
                                                                                                                      
18 See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000) (reiterating the need for federal legis-
lation to comport with the federalism principles announced in Printz and New York v. United 
States); Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156–57. 
19 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904; TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 585; see 
also infra notes 123–223 and accompanying text. There has been a sharp increase in circuit 
court decisions on this issue since 2005. See infra notes 123–130 and accompanying text. 
The sudden increase in Tenth Amendment standing cases presents an intriguing devel-
opment that may be attributable to the increased prominence of the Tenth Amendment 
itself in Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 149; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156–57. 
20 306 U.S. at 144; see also infra notes 123–223 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 131–151 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 230–264 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 265–278 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 42–295 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 279–310 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 279–310 and accompanying text. 
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 Part I of this Note discusses the Supreme Court’s oscillating view of 
the Tenth Amendment and how the Amendment’s modern resurgence 
lays the foundation for private party standing to raise Tenth Amend-
ment claims.28 The development of the standing doctrine additionally 
presents requirements for—and obstacles to—standing that set the 
backdrop against which the current debate over Tenth Amendment 
standing unfolds, and illustrates how demonstrating personal harm is 
the centerpiece of the standing inquiry.29 Part I concludes by present-
ing the central case TVA and other Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing private party Tenth Amendment standing that together showcase 
the inconclusiveness of Supreme Court precedent.30 Part II outlines 
how the circuit courts of appeals have responded to this precedent in 
contradictory ways: some permitting private party Tenth Amendment 
standing, some denying it outright, and some denying it unless align-
ment with state interests can be demonstrated.31 Part III presents an 
analysis of the Supreme Court precedent on the question of private 
party Tenth Amendment standing.32 It examines the language of the 
Amendment, standing doctrine, and the reasoning presented by the 
circuit courts in reaching divergent private party standing decisions, 
and concludes that the minority position should be vindicated and 
standing granted to private parties raising Tenth Amendment claims 
who demonstrate personal harm.33 The Note argues that the Supreme 
Court should adopt the now-minority position that private parties may 
bring Tenth Amendment claims, regardless of alignment with the 
state’s avowed interests.34 Such a decision would be most consistent with 
the language of the Constitution and the Supreme Court’s trend to-
ward giving the Tenth Amendment substantive force and acknowledg-
ing that the Amendment exists to protect individuals.35 
                                                                                                                      
28 See infra notes 36–74 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra notes 75–100 and accompanying text. 
30 See infra notes 101–122 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 123–223 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 224–328 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 224–328 and accompanying text. 
34 See infra notes 224–328 and accompanying text. For a similar view, see generally Kris-
tin Oickle, “But a Truism”: Why ‘the People’ Have Standing Rights Under the Tenth 
Amendment and How Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Electric Authority Led to Nearly 
Seventy-Five Years of Confusion (abstract of unpublished note), available at http://acslaw. 
org/pdf/Student%20Chapters/Writing%20Competition/2010/Tenth%20Amendment.Ab
stract.pdf. 
35 See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 156–57; Ara B. Gershengorn, Note, Pri-
vate Party Standing to Raise Tenth Amendment Commandeering Challenges, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 
1065, 1082–88 (2000). 
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I. Development of the Modern Approach to the Tenth 
Amendment and Standing 
 The debate regarding Tenth Amendment standing flows directly 
from the evolution of the Tenth Amendment and the development of 
the standing doctrine; to understand who should be allowed to assert 
claims under the Amendment, it is first necessary to examine the scope 
and purpose of both the Amendment and of standing doctrine.36 The 
Tenth Amendment was largely regarded as meaningless until 1918 when 
the Supreme Court gave it substantive force, a force that was again 
stripped away in 1941, and then vigorously revived by a series of Su-
preme Court decisions beginning in the early 1990s.37 Although schol-
ars largely agree on the history of the Tenth Amendment, they debate 
its scope and its intended beneficiaries.38 
 Like the Tenth Amendment, the standing doctrine has developed 
and shifted over time.39 Requiring the presence of distinct, personal 
harm and that parties bring claims asserting only their own rights, the 
Supreme Court has imposed bars against third-party standing and gen-
eralized grievances, or “citizen-suits.”40 The development of both mod-
ern standing doctrine and of the Tenth Amendment has directly im-
pacted how the U.S. courts of appeals have interpreted the Supreme 
Court’s 1939 decision Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Author-
ity—which arguably prohibited private party Tenth Amendment stand-
ing—and therefore, both are discussed in turn.41 
A. Oscillating History and Conflicting Meanings of the Tenth Amendment 
1. Substantive Force of the Tenth Amendment 
 The Supreme Court’s treatment of the Tenth Amendment is one 
marked by conflicting periods.42 The Tenth Amendment succinctly pro-
vides, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
                                                                                                                      
36 See infra notes 42–100 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 42–66 and accompanying text. 
38 See infra notes 67–74, 287–295 and accompanying text. 
39 See infra notes 75–100 and accompanying text. 
40 See infra notes 75–100 and accompanying text. 
41 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939); see infra notes 42–122 and accompanying text. 
42 Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 313. Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 
156–57 (1992) (giving substantive force to the Amendment), and Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
247 U.S. 251, 275–76 (1918) (striking down an act of Congress for violating Tenth 
Amendment principles), with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941) (labeling 
the Amendment a mere “truism” lacking substantive force). 
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tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respec-
tively, or to the people.”43 In the first quarter of the nineteenth century, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that despite the existence of the Tenth 
Amendment, concerns for state sovereignty would not provide a consti-
tutional bar to congressional actions.44 The Tenth Amendment was 
largely impotent until a dramatic shift occurred at the start of the next 
century when an act of Congress was struck down for infringing on state 
authority.45 
 The Court soon reversed its position once again, however, in 1941 
when the Court labeled the Tenth Amendment a “truism,” merely in-
cluded in the Constitution to placate the Antifederalists and their fears 
about the strength of the national government.46 Besides a brief state-
ment by the Court in 1975 that the Tenth Amendment “is not without 
significance,”47 and an anomalous 1976 case where the Court wielded 
the Tenth Amendment to strike down parts of the Fair Labor Standards 
Act,48 the Court continued to disregard the Tenth Amendment as a 
palpable restraint on congressional power for decades.49 In 1985, the 
                                                                                                                      
43 U.S. Const. amend. X. 
44 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 196–97, 206 (1824). 
45 Hammer, 247 U.S. at 276. In the 1918 case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, the Supreme Court 
struck down a congressional act prohibiting the interstate shipment of goods made by child 
labor. See id. at 268, 276. It deemed the act unconstitutional for infringing on the authority of 
the states by regulating production. See id. at 276. This decision set the stage for subsequent 
Supreme Court cases striking down, under the Tenth Amendment, certain acts of Congress 
carried out pursuant to the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 69–70, 
78 (1936); Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 39–40 (1922); Hammer, 247 U.S. at 
276. The evolution of the Tenth Amendment has largely been linked to the development of 
the Commerce Clause. Anthony B. Ching, Traveling Down the Unsteady Path: United States v. 
Lopez, New York v. United States, and the Tenth Amendment, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 99, 103, 110, 
141–42 (1995). Historically, as Congress’s Commerce Clause powers waxed, the substantive 
force of the Tenth Amendment correspondingly waned. Id. The conflict between federal and 
state powers lodged in the Constitution’s structure creates this diametric relationship be-
tween increased federal power exerted under the Commerce Clause and a parallel decrease 
in state sovereignty safeguarded by the Tenth Amendment. Id. Writing as an assistant attorney 
general for the state of Arizona, Anthony Ching links the alternating weight accorded the 
Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment with varying judicial personalities, and with 
the social, political, and economic attitude of the American people. See id. at 106, 141–42. 
46 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
47 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975) (holding nonetheless that the 
Tenth Amendment could not be used to strike down the federal legislation at issue). 
48 See Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842, 845, 852 (1976). This was the 
sole Supreme Court opinion between Darby v. United States in 1941 and Gregory v. Ashcroft in 
1991 to give the Tenth Amendment substantive force. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 
319; infra note 51 and accompanying text. 
49 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545–47, 552 (1985) 
(declaring the Usery approach unworkable). 
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Supreme Court continued to relegate the Tenth Amendment to its 
mainly ornamental role, declaring the political process the only safe-
guard against federal encroachment on state sovereignty.50 
  In 1991, however, the Court, in an opinion by Justice O’Connor, 
initiated the resurgence of the Tenth Amendment when it decided 
Gregory v. Ashcroft.51 The Court rescued the Tenth Amendment from 
meaninglessness when it employed the Amendment as a limit on how 
federal law may impose burdens on state government.52 In that opin-
ion, which established the Tenth Amendment precedent that the Court 
has followed ever since, the Court emphasized the crucial role of state 
governments in preventing federal tyranny and reaffirmed the Tenth 
Amendment as a substantive protector of state sovereignty.53 
 The Gregory opinion was bolstered the following year in 1992 when 
the Court decided New York v. United States and declared the Tenth 
Amendment to forbid the federal government from “commandeering” 
state legislatures.54 The Court found the Commerce Clause power in-
adequate to save a federal act where the act violated the state sover-
eignty protected by the Tenth Amendment.55 In New York v. United States 
the Court banned the federal government from directly compelling the 
legislative processes of the states to enact and enforce a federal regula-
tory program.56 The Court distinguished “commandeering,” which it 
held to be unconstitutional, from cases where Congress merely sought 
to subject state governments to generally applicable laws.57 Thus, the 
distinction was crystallized between the acceptable federal government 
control of activity within the states—such as pre-empting state legisla-
tion or attaching conditions to funds—and unconstitutional “comman-
                                                                                                                      
50 See id. Other cases from that time like Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation, 
decided by the Court in 1981, similarly undermined the power of the Tenth Amendment. See 
452 U.S. 264, 287 n.28, 288 (1981) (refusing to give the Tenth Amendment substantive force 
in relation to congressional actions under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment). Hodel, 
however, did identify impermissible “commandeering” actions of the federal government, 
laying the foundation for the Tenth Amendment’s modern resurgence. See id. at 288. 
51 See 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991). But see Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: 
Why Congress Should Tread Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 
397, 401–02 (2008) (asserting that the substantive force of the Tenth Amendment is still 
diminished and great deference is afforded Congress in the arena of spending and the 
conditions that can be attached to federal grants). 
52 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458. 
53 See id.; see also Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 149 (2000); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 935 (1997). 
54 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 175–76. 
55 See id. at 180. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
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deering” where the federal government seeks to compel states to act or 
to administer a federal regulatory program.58 Again writing for the 
Court, Justice O’Connor reiterated the substantive role of the Tenth 
Amendment in protecting states’ rights.59 What is more, the Court in 
New York v. United States went on to define the relation of private parties 
to the Tenth Amendment when it specified that “the Constitution di-
vides authority between federal and state governments for the protec-
tion of individuals . . . . ‘[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.’”60 
  Printz v. United States and Reno v. Condon, respectively decided by 
the Supreme Court in 1997 and 2000, reaffirmed the substantive power 
of the Tenth Amendment to protect state sovereignty.61 In Printz, local 
chief law enforcement officers (“CLEOs”) complained that provisions 
of the Brady Act forced them to essentially work for the federal gov-
ernment and to execute federal laws.62 The Court ruled that the consti-
tutional separation of the federal and state governments must be pre-
served, and that the federal government could not command state 
officials to administer federal laws.63 Printz expanded the definition of 
“commandeering” from New York v. United States to encompass federal 
statutory provisions that require administration by state executive offi-
cials.64 In Reno, a statute regulating the state’s sale of driver’s license 
information was deemed valid, but only because it regulated without 
seeking to control or influence state activities.65 Together, Printz and 
Reno affirmed the readiness of the Court in modern times to use the 
Tenth Amendment to substantively safeguard state autonomy from fed-
eral interference.66 
                                                                                                                      
58 See id. at 176–78. In reaching its conclusion that commandeering is incompatible 
with the structure for governance set out in the Constitution, the Court referenced his-
torical records of the Constitutional Convention and the Federalist Papers. Jared O’Connor, 
Note, National League of Cities Rising: How the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Could Expand 
Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 30 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 315, 337–38 (2003) (noting the 
need for political accountability and state citizens’ right to hold their local state officials 
responsible for governing decisions). 
59 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157. 
60 See id. at 181 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991)). 
61 See Reno, 528 U.S. at 149; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
62 521 U.S. at 904–05. 
63 See id. at 935. 
64 See id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 176–78. 
65 See 528 U.S. at 150–51. 
66 See id. at 149; Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
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2. Scope and Text of the Tenth Amendment’s Protections 
 The substantive force of the Tenth Amendment is not its only con-
troversial aspect: although modern legal scholars widely agree on the 
history and purpose of the inclusion of the Tenth Amendment in the 
Constitution, they debate the meaning of its scope and text.67 As for the 
settled history and purpose, the Tenth Amendment concludes the Bill 
of Rights portion of the Constitution that was intended to protect 
against abuses by the federal government.68 It expresses the federalist 
distinction between national and local governments and recognizes the 
sovereignty of each---a distinction that was urged at the First Congress 
by the Antifederalists, who feared the creation of a strong national gov-
ernment that would jeopardize state sovereignty and lead to tyranny.69 
The Amendment thus specifies that the powers of government not enu-
merated as national powers in the Constitution belong to the states and 
the people.70 
 As for the scope and text, particularly relevant to the question of to 
whom the Tenth Amendment grants rights is the role of the Amend-
ment’s closing phrase “to the people,” a phrase added to the Amend-
ment without debate, but one that has sparked much since.71 Because 
the Court presumes that every clause in the Constitution has meaning, 
                                                                                                                      
67 See Ching, supra note 46, at 102; Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amend-
ment Limitations and Criminological Considerations, 60 Hastings L.J. 1339, 1350 n.68 (2009) 
(interpreting the use of “the people” in the Bill of Rights to signify enforceable, individual 
rights); Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1083–87 (presenting the history of the Tenth 
Amendment’s inclusion in the Constitution and arguing that the history and text of the 
Amendment demonstrate that it protects an individual right); Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the 
Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1577, 1609–10 (2009). Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 
181 (stating that the Tenth Amendment exists to protect individuals), with Erin Ryan, Fed-
eralism at the Cathedral: Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability Rules in the Tenth 
Amendment Infrastructure, 81 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1, 7–8, 41 (2010) (criticizing the Court’s 
description in New York v. United States of the Tenth Amendment as safeguarding an indi-
vidual right). 
68 See Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 650 (1948) (identifying the Tenth Amendment as part 
of the Bill of Rights, the purpose of which was to restrict the federal government’s power); see 
also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). But see McDonald v. 
City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3059 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing generally Bar-
ron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833)) (identifying only the first eight amendments as 
inserted to pacify Antifederalist concerns about federal government power); In Re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358, 384 n.11 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing H. Flack, The Adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment 95 (1908)) (citing various debating scholars, one of whom identi-
fies only the first eight amendments as constituting the Bill of Rights). 
69 Lash, supra note 67, at 1609–10; see Ching, supra note 46, at 102. 
70 U.S. Const. amend. X; Ching, supra note 46, at 102. 
71 See Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1085–87. 
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this clause must convey something.72 Scholars have put forward the fol-
lowing three potential meanings: (1) that the Amendment safeguards 
certain powers of the people, separate from those possessed by the state 
and federal governments; (2) that the phrase really means “to the peo-
ple of the several states” and just divides the powers between the federal 
and state governments; or (3) that the phrase indicates that the people 
themselves hold the rights secured by the Amendment.73 This dis-
agreement about the text and scope of the Amendment gives rise to dis-
agreement over who holds rights under the Amendment, and thus over 
who may potentially bring a Tenth Amendment claim.74 
B. The Modern Standing Doctrine 
 The standing doctrine demonstrates the role of particularized, dis-
crete harm in determining Tenth Amendment standing, and the gen-
eral requirements of the doctrine present a separate hurdle for parties 
seeking to bring claims under the Amendment.75 At its core, standing 
ensures that a plaintiff is the correct party to bring the case at hand, 
apart from the examination of the merits of the case.76 The Supreme 
Court has offered several justifications for the standing doctrine, in-
cluding safeguarding the separation of powers and ensuring that ideo-
logical plaintiffs do not consume court resources.77 Three constitu-
tional requirements must be satisfied to have standing to bring a case: 
first the plaintiff must have suffered or imminently will suffer an injury; 
second, the injury must be caused by the defendant’s conduct; and 
third, a favorable court decision must be likely to redress the injury— 
the “redressability prong.”78 Rooted in the Constitution’s provision that 
Article III courts may only decide “cases” and “controversies,” the stand-
ing doctrine requires that parties have a personal stake in the litigation 
and be truly adversarial.79 
                                                                                                                      
72 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803). 
73 See Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1085–87. 
74 See id. 
75 See infra notes 76–100 and accompanying text. 
76 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99–100 (1968). 
77 Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 
192 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring). 
78 Ne. Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 
656, 663–64 (1993). The redressability prong revolves around the central inquiry, “Will the 
federal court decision make a difference?” Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 75. A plaintiff 
need not demonstrate that a favorable decision will relieve every injury. See id. at 81. 
79 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
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 The Court has correspondingly developed both a prudential 
“third-party standing bar” that denies standing to third-party plaintiffs 
(individuals bringing suit to enforce another party’s rights), and a ban 
on generalized grievances.80 In the 1975 case of Warth v. Seldin, the 
Court articulated the third-party standing bar when it expressed that, 
regardless of sufficient injury, plaintiffs may only bring claims when as-
serting their own legal rights.81 Similarly, the taxpayer or “citizen stand-
ing” bar prevents a plaintiff from bringing suit based on a harm or gen-
eralized grievance that all taxpayers equally share in common.82 
 In 1923, the Supreme Court decided Frothingham v. Mellon and 
held that a plaintiff lacked standing when she sought to challenge the 
Maternity Act of 1921 as invading the local concerns of the state be-
cause it authorized appropriations to reduce the infant and maternal 
mortality rates.83 The Court required that a party raising a claim against 
a statute must demonstrate not only the invalidity of the statute, but 
also some distinct, personal harm suffered by the plaintiff resulting 
from it.84 Frothingham articulates the generalized grievance ban, which 
states that a party raising a suit must personally suffer some distinct, 
particularized injury in order to have standing to bring a claim.85 
 In 1968, the Court decided Flast v. Cohen, in which the plaintiffs 
challenged the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 as 
violating the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First 
Amendment because it provided federal funds for religious schools.86 
There, the plaintiffs were granted standing because the Court deter-
mined that their asserted injuries and rights were personal, not merely 
“third-party.”87 The Court established a narrow allowance for taxpayer 
                                                                                                                      
80 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113–14 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
81 422 U.S. at 498–99. 
82 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 79–80; Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06. The Supreme Court 
has suggested that the taxpayer standing bar may be constitutionally required and not 
simply prudential. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 574–78 (1992); Flast, 
392 U.S. at 101. 
83 See 262 U.S. 447, 479–80, 487 (1923). In denying the plaintiff standing, the Court 
repeatedly emphasized that nothing could be done under the Act without the state’s con-
sent. See id. at 480, 483. 
84 See id. at 487–88 (deeming the plaintiff’s alleged harm—that the statute would effec-
tually take her property under the guise of taxation—an insufficiently personal, distinct 
harm for standing purposes). 
85 See id. (considering the plaintiff’s interest—that her taxes not go up—to be an inter-
est shared with millions of others, and one that is too minute, remote, and indeterminable 
to warrant standing). 
86 See 392 U.S. at 85, 105–06. 
87 Id. at 105–06. 
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standing in Flast when it determined that taxpayer suits may be brought 
only when two conditions are met: first, a logical link connects the 
plaintiff’s status as taxpayer and the legislative act being attacked; and 
second, a nexus exists between that status and the exact nature of the 
constitutional infringement alleged.88 
 In the years since the Court decided Flast, its holding has seem-
ingly been narrowed to permit taxpayer standing only in cases con-
nected to a federal spending program under Article 1, Section 8 of the 
Constitution and alleging a violation of the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.89 In 1978, however, the Supreme Court decided Duke 
Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc. and relaxed the 
standing requirements by holding that Flast’s nexus analysis should be 
limited to cases presenting generalized grievances, and that constitu-
tional claims involving concrete, particularized injury need not satisfy 
the nexus requirements.90 
 The Court has held that concrete, particularized injuries to consti-
tutional rights may be adequate to grant standing whenever the suit is 
grounded in a constitutional provision that actually bestows rights.91 A 
party bringing a suit regarding “a constitutional provision dealing with 
the structure of government is unlikely to be granted standing unless 
the person has suffered a particular harm distinctive from the rest of 
the population.”92 No matter how widely shared the grievance may be, 
the suffering of a concrete harm resulting from the alleged violation of 
a constitutional right conveys standing.93 In deciding FEC v. Akins in 
1978 (a case grounded in a right created by a federal statute, not the 
Constitution), the Court noted that the plaintiffs had standing because 
the statute sought to protect individuals, like the plaintiffs, from the 
precise kind of harm alleged.94 
 Furthermore, although the restriction against third-party standing 
presents an obstacle whenever the plaintiff is not the direct object of 
                                                                                                                      
88 See id. at 102–03. 
89 See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 228 (1974); 
Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176–78. 
90 See Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78–79; Flast, 392 U.S. at 102. 
91 See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 25–26 (1998); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78–79; Chemer-
insky, supra note 8, at 71. 
92 See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 71 (emphasis added). 
93 See Akins, 524 U.S. at 25–26. 
94 Id. Although the Tenth Amendment involves a constitutionally conferred right as 
opposed to a statutorily created one as in Akins, the key point is that the plaintiff was 
granted standing because he suffered particularized, concrete injury and was the holder of 
the right upon which his claim rested. See id. 
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the governmental action or inaction in question, that obstacle can be 
surmounted by a demonstration of significant personal injury to the 
plaintiff.95 For example, in the 1992 case of Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
even though certain endangered animals, and not the plaintiffs, were 
the objects of the governmental action, the Court held that the plain-
tiffs could have been granted standing had they shown sufficient per-
sonal harm.96 In its 2000 decision in Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services, the Court held that the plaintiffs had significant 
injury to seek a court order compelling compliance with the Clean Wa-
ter Act because their recreational use of the river was disturbed by the 
pollution resulting from Laidlaw’s failure to comply.97 There, the legis-
lation was sufficiently linked with the plaintiffs’ directly affected recrea-
tional, aesthetic, and economic interests.98 Under the rubric estab-
lished by these cases, it matters not that the federal governmental 
action in question has as the object of its regulation endangered ani-
mals or a park, so long as the plaintiffs are directly, uniquely, and per-
sonally affected by the action.99 When a private party suffers distinct 
and personalized injury as a result of a violation of one of that party’s 
rights, then the party, so long as the other standing requirements are 
satisfied, has standing to raise a claim before the courts.100 
C. The Supreme Court on Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing 
 The circuit courts holding the current majority view identify Ten-
nessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”), decided in 
1939, as the seminal and sole case in which the Supreme Court directly 
addressed—and went on to prohibit—private party Tenth Amendment 
standing.101 The case arose when the federal Tennessee Valley Authority 
Act created a corporation that was required to create dams and sell the 
power produced by them throughout several states.102 This federally 
mandated production of electricity created unwanted competition for 
the private electric companies, who enjoyed the state-conferred bene-
                                                                                                                      
95 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
96 See id. 
97 528 U.S. 167, 183–84 (2000). 
98 See id. 
99 See id.; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
100 See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64; Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 78–79. 
101 See 306 U.S. at 144; see also Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp B v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 
F.3d 219, 234 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 (10th Cir. 2004). 
102 TVA, 306 U.S. at 134–35. 
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fits associated with being public utilities.103 Resentful of the new compe-
tition that they deemed to constitute a taking of property, the private 
electric companies filed a complaint seeking to enjoin the production 
and sale of power that was mandated by the Act.104 Though the appel-
lants had no right to be the exclusive producers of power within the 
respective states, they pointed to state statutes giving the states—not the 
federal government—exclusive power to regulate and authorize any 
entity to operate and sell power within the state.105 
 In carefully outlining and responding to the appellants’ multiple 
arguments, the Court determined that the federal action enacted mere 
competition, not actual regulation.106 The Court rejected the appel-
lants’ claim that the Act constituted illegal competition, and thus “a 
taking,” and denied that the private companies ever possessed the right 
to be free from competition.107 The Court’s discussion of standing re-
volved around the private parties’ incorporated status and which prop-
erty rights were and were not conferred by such status, a question the 
Court resolved by proclaiming that monopoly and freedom from com-
petition were not among the conferred rights.108 
 Moving on to the appellants’ Tenth Amendment argument, the 
Court characterized the argument as follows: that the federal govern-
ment was unconstitutionally regulating the private company rates—a 
matter of state domain—by requiring new power production by the Au-
thority that would be sold at lower rates.109 The Court rejected the appel-
lants’ claims that the federal actions amounted to regulation and held 
the resultant effect on competition to be merely a collateral effect and 
not an infringement on state liberty.110 The Court then pronounced that 
“appellants, absent the states or their officers, have no standing in this 
suit to raise any question under the [Tenth] [A]mendment.”111 The 
Court only offered this pronouncement after first deciding that there 
was no federal regulation that infringed on state liberty, and thus no vio-
                                                                                                                      
103 Id. at 137. 
104 Id. at 135–36. 
105 Id. at 140. Several of the states, however, went on to adopt policies and laws facilitat-
ing the work of the Authority, seemingly indicating state consent to the federal actions. Id. 
at 141. Interestingly, the Court in TVA never considered state consent as an absolute de-
fense to the appellants’ Tenth Amendment claim. See id. 
106 Id. at 143–44. 
107 Id. at 136–41. 
108 TVA, 306 U.S. at 138–39. 
109 See id. at 143. 
110 Id. at 143–44. 
111 Id. at 144. 
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lation of the Tenth Amendment.112 In the decades since, the Court’s one-
sentence commentary regarding the private companies’ Tenth Amend-
ment standing and state officers has been read in one of three ways:(1) 
as the authoritative word denying all private party Tenth Amendment 
standing; (2) as a limited holding applicable in cases when the plaintiff 
attempts to assert interests not in alignment with state interests; or (3) as 
mere dicta never intended to establish new, binding precedent.113 
 Writing in dissent, Justice Butler argued that the electric compa-
nies had in fact suffered a concrete, personal harm and that they 
should be granted standing.114 The dissent asserted that the private 
electric companies suffered sufficient distinct harm when the Act in-
fringed on their profits.115 
 Although the Court has not explicitly addressed private party 
standing under the Tenth Amendment except in TVA, during the New 
Deal era the Court permitted cases involving such claims to be decided 
on the merits.116 In the 1937 Supreme Court case of Helvering v. Davis, a 
plaintiff complained that the Social Security Program invaded the 
Tenth Amendment rights of the state, a claim that the Court denied 
without reference to standing.117 A private party Tenth Amendment 
claim in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis was similarly decided on the merits 
by the Supreme Court on the same day as Helvering.118 In 2000 the 
Court heard and decided on the merits a Tenth Amendment claim 
brought by local CLEOs.119 In these cases standing was thus implicitly 
                                                                                                                      
112 See id. A court may not consider the merits of a case over which it lacks jurisdiction. 
See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998) (holding that, if a 
party lacks standing to bring a claim, a court has no jurisdiction over that claim). For an 
analysis of the implications of this doctrine for the Court’s statement about standing in 
TVA, see supra notes 234–236 and accompanying text. 
113 Compare, e.g., Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that TVA 
constitutes binding precedent prohibiting all private party Tenth Amendment standing), 
and Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284–85 (same, but positing an exception for private parties whose 
interests align with the state’s), with Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the Court’s Tenth Amendment standing discussion in TVA was 
cursory and not binding precedent given the expansion of standing since the Court de-
cided TVA). Some subsequent circuit court cases allow an exception for private parties 
whose interests align with those of the state but TVA’s one-sentence standing commentary, 
relied upon by those courts, did not provide for such an exception. See infra notes 163–193 
and accompanying text. 
114 TVA, 306 U.S. at 152 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. 
116 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 
U.S. 548, 585 (1937). 
117 See 301 U.S. at 640. 
118 See 301 U.S. at 585. 
119 Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933. 
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permitted because it is a long-established principle that a court may not 
proceed to decide the merits of a case unless it first establishes that it 
has jurisdiction, which includes a determination that the parties have 
standing.120 
 In 2003 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to defini-
tively resolve the question of private party standing under the Tenth 
Amendment, yet produced no such resolution when the Court ulti-
mately decided the case on other grounds.121 The Supreme Court's re-
cent grant of certiorari in United States v. Bond, where the Third Circuit 
denied private party Tenth Amendment standing, provides the Court 
with an opportunity to clarify TVA’s holding and to explicitly affirm or 
reject the Court's practice of deciding private parties' Tenth Amend-
ment claims on the merits.122 
II. Conflicting Decisions of the Circuit Courts on Private 
Party Tenth Amendment Standing 
 Having considered the history and development of Tenth Amend-
ment and standing jurisprudence, this Part analyzes the divergent fed-
eral appeals court precedent surrounding private party Tenth Amend-
ment standing.123 The U.S. courts of appeals have reacted to the 
Court’s mixed signals and long silence regarding private party standing 
under the Tenth Amendment in rapidly evolving and contradicting 
ways.124 As recently as the start of 2005, only three circuit courts had 
decided the issue, both the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Seventh and 
Eleventh Circuits permitting private party standing, and the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit alone denying it.125 In the short span 
of time since then, five more circuit courts have definitively weighed in 
on the issue, all of them siding with the once-minority position of the 
Tenth Circuit.126 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have determined 
                                                                                                                      
120 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 100–02; Muskat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911) 
(prohibiting courts from issuing advisory opinions). 
121 See Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 147–48 (2003); see also infra 
notes 181–182 and accompanying text. 
122 See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 137 (3rd Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 09-1227). 
123 See infra notes 131–223 and accompanying text. 
124 See infra notes 131–223 and accompanying text. 
125 Compare Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 703 (7th Cir. 1999), and At-
lanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 666 F.2d 1359, 1368 n.16 (11th Cir. 1982), with 
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 761 (10th Cir. 1980). 
126 See United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 137 (3rd Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 
U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 09-1227); United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 
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that no binding Supreme Court precedent confines their analyses and 
have instead pointed to the Supreme Court’s modern endorsement of 
wider standing and substantive enforcement of the Tenth Amendment 
in support of their rulings permitting private party Tenth Amendment 
standing.127 In contrast, the other circuit courts deciding the issue have 
found the Supreme Court’s 1939 case of Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) to be a binding, definitive rejection by 
the Supreme Court of private party Tenth Amendment standing.128 De-
spite their apparent uniformity, however, circuit courts denying such 
standing differ on a potential exception that would grant private party 
standing in limited Tenth Amendment cases when a party’s interests 
align with the state’s.129 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia has also provided analysis relevant to the question, though it 
has avoided definitively deciding the validity of private party Tenth 
Amendment standing.130 
A. Circuit Courts Granting Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing 
 Two circuit courts have granted private party Tenth Amendment 
standing, determining either explicitly or implicitly that TVA is not au-
thoritative precedent.131 The Seventh Circuit emphasized the Tenth 
Amendment’s protection of individual rights, as elucidated in the Su-
preme Court’s 1992 decision in New York v. United States, and the con-
nection of those Tenth Amendment rights to the plaintiff’s personal 
harm.132 The Eleventh Circuit likewise held that standing should be 
granted because of the presence of particularized injury in the case and 
Supreme Court precedent implicitly granting such standing.133 
 The Seventh Circuit in 1999 made the most vigorous case for per-
mitting private party Tenth Amendment standing in Gillespie v. City of 
Indianapolis.134 There, the plaintiff was a police officer fired from his 
job after the Gun Control Act of 1968 outlawed his carrying a firearm 
                                                                                                                      
526 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 302 (2009); Oregon v. Legal Servs. Corp., 552 
F.3d 965, 972 (9th Cir. 2009); Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 
219, 234 (2d Cir. 2006); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005). 
127 See infra notes 131–151 and accompanying text. 
128 Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939); see infra notes 
160–215 and accompanying text. 
129 See infra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
130 See infra notes 216–223 and accompanying text. 
131 Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703; Atlanta Gas Light Co., 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16. 
132 See infra notes 134–141 and accompanying text. 
133 See infra notes 142–147 and accompanying text. 
134 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 700–03. 
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because he had been convicted of domestic violence.135 The plaintiff 
argued that the Act was an unconstitutional infringement on the state’s 
right to select its own militia members and infringed on a traditional 
area of state sovereignty.136 Though the court denied the plaintiff’s 
claim on the merits, it granted him standing, citing the Supreme 
Court’s pronouncement in New York v. United States that the Tenth 
Amendment protects the rights of individuals.137 Under this analysis, 
the federal government’s violation of the Tenth Amendment was po-
tentially a violation of the plaintiff’s personal rights guaranteed to him 
by the Tenth Amendment and did not implicate the third-party stand-
ing bar, which bans parties from bringing claims based on others’ 
rights.138 The court questioned whether the plaintiff was really injured 
by any Tenth Amendment violation and noted that his right to carry a 
gun had nothing to do with the state’s sovereignty, and that any Tenth 
Amendment injury to him was thus incidental.139 Relying, however, on 
the lowering of the standing barriers since TVA and its mere casual ref-
erence to private party Tenth Amendment standing, the court did not 
feel obligated to deny standing.140 The court cited the Supreme Court’s 
1978 decision in Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group for 
the proposition that an incidental connection is sufficient to bring a 
constitutional claim, reasoning that Duke Power Co. limited the nexus 
requirement from the Supreme Court’s 1968 decision in Flast v. Cohen 
to taxpayer suits involving generalized grievances.141 
 The Eleventh Circuit’s 1982 decision in Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. U.S. 
Department of Energy arose out of Tenth Amendment constitutional chal-
lenges to amendments and regulations made pursuant to the federal 
Fuel Use Act of 1978.142 The court noted modern trends in favor of 
granting standing when plaintiffs show personal injury and referred to 
the Tenth Amendment standing granted by implication in the Su-
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. at 697. 
136 Id. at 700. The court noted that, as a member of the local police, the plaintiff was 
subject to being called upon to serve in the state’s National Guard, also known as its mili-
tia. See id. at 697. 
137 Id. at 703, 708; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181–82 (1992); supra 
notes 54–60 and accompanying text. 
138 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 703; see also Douglas G. Bechtel, Survey, U.S. v. Parker: Will 
Those with Standing Please Stand Up, 82 Denv. U. L. Rev. 479, 497 (2005) (suggesting that 
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation most aligns with the Constitution’s text). 
139 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 701. 
140 Id. at 700–02. 
141 Id. at 702 (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79 
(1978)); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968). 
142 Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1361. 
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preme Court New Deal Era cases.143 It held that under Duke Power Co., a 
plaintiff may make constitutional objections to a federal act so long as 
that party demonstrates injury and causal connection.144 The Atlanta 
Gas court ruled that the petitioners had demonstrated injury and 
causal connection to the federal action in question, and thus were not 
bound by the Flast nexus scheme.145 The Eleventh Circuit has since re-
iterated that a Tenth Amendment claim in and of itself does not raise a 
problem of a generalized grievance because a party bringing a Tenth 
Amendment claim has standing so long as the party can identify a con-
crete, personalized injury resulting from the alleged constitutional vio-
lation.146 Only Tenth Amendment claims presenting an undifferenti-
ated, generalized grievance shared by all citizens results in a lack of 
standing.147 
 The Seventh and Eleventh Circuits distinguished (implicitly in the 
case of the Eleventh Circuit) the TVA Court’s intimations against pri-
vate party Tenth Amendment standing, determining that the plaintiff 
may pursue a Tenth Amendment claim when asserting the plaintiff’s 
own rights, and not when asserting a state’s rights.148 According to the 
decisions of these circuit courts, Tenth Amendment standing is in 
doubt only when parties raise a generalized grievance lacking requisite 
personal injury.149 The two circuit courts expounded that it was the Su-
preme Court’s practice simply to deny standing when parties do not 
object on the basis of any particularized harm to any recognized per-
sonal rights upon which the federal government has infringed.150 Fur-
thermore, both circuit courts highlighted prior Supreme Court deci-
sions implicitly granting private party Tenth Amendment standing as 
raising strong doubts about whether the Court’s cursory mention of 
Tenth Amendment standing in TVA could be any more than dicta.151 
                                                                                                                      
143 Id. at 1368 n.16 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639–41 (1937)). 
144 Id. (citing Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 79). 
145 Id. 
146 See Dillard v. Chilton Cnty. Comm’n, 495 F.3d 1324, 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2007). 
147 Id. at 1334–35. In 2010, the Eleventh Circuit decided United States v. Gorham and re-
affirmed its position that private parties can attain Tenth Amendment standing unless they 
lack personalized injury. See 377 F. App’x 899, 901 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). 
148 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 700–02; Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16; see also Flast, 392 
U.S. at 101–02; TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
149 Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 700–01; Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16. 
150 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 701–02; Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16. 
151 See Gillespie, 185 F.3d at 701–02; Atlanta Gas, 666 F.2d at 1368 n.16 (discussing Su-
preme Court precedent implicitly allowing private party Tenth Amendment standing, but 
not explicitly referencing TVA); see also TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
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 In 1991, the Fourth Circuit issued a brief, unpublished per curiam 
decision in Metrolina Family Practice Group v. Sullivan affirming a grant of 
private party Tenth Amendment standing.152 The court held that physi-
cians alleging that they were injured by a federal regulation that would 
impinge on their profits asserted sufficient personal injury in fact, and 
thus asserted their own rights and were not third-party plaintiffs.153 The 
court gave its imprimatur to the district court’s description of Tenth 
Amendment jurisprudence, which stated that private parties, and not 
only states, have standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims.154 The un-
published status of the Fourth Circuit’s opinion limits its authoritative 
force but nonetheless indicates that an additional federal appeals court 
is inclined to recognize private party Tenth Amendment standing.155 
 In a 2010 decision, the Fourth Circuit avoided committing itself to 
a position on private party Tenth Amendment standing, but character-
ized the standing question as only a prudential one that could be 
waived in order to reach a decision on the merits.156 In dicta the court 
stated that the plaintiff had satisfied the traditional standing prongs 
and that only a rule barring private parties from raising Tenth 
Amendment claims would result in him being denied standing.157 Al-
though the court acknowledged the weight of other circuits’ prece-
dents holding that private parties lack such standing, no resolution of 
the question was deemed necessary because the court ruled that the 
plaintiff’s Tenth Amendment claim was implausible on the merits.158 
The Fourth Circuit’s decision offers no independent analysis of the 
Constitution or of TVA but is significant for deviating from the majority 
of circuits, which have never suggested that these cases should be de-
cided on the merits regardless of a potential bar on private party Tenth 
Amendment standing. 159 
B. Circuit Courts Denying Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing 
 By contrast, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, 
Third, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have all deemed TVA to be 
                                                                                                                      
152 (Sullivan II ), 929 F.2d 693, 693 (4th Cir. 1991) (per curiam), aff’g (Sullivan I ), 767 
F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (W.D.N.C. 1989). 
153 See Sullivan II, 929 F.2d at 693. 
154 Id.; Sullivan I, 767 F. Supp. at 1320. 
155 See Sullivan II, 929 F.2d at 693. 
156 Kennedy v. Allera, 612 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2010). 
157 See id. at 269 n.3. 
158 See id. 
159 See id. 
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binding precedent rejecting private party Tenth Amendment standing 
and barring any independent analysis.160 The result has been a rapid 
shift toward denying private party Tenth Amendment standing—a shift 
that has yet to be given scholarly consideration.161 Yet underlying the 
recent trend toward denying standing is an undercurrent of uncer-
tainty as the circuit courts fall into disagreement and probe the ques-
tion of what exceptions should be granted to private parties whose in-
terests align with the state’s interests.162 
 Relying on the third-party standing bar, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit has ruled that the Tenth Amendment protects 
states’ rights alone.163 In 1980 the Tenth Circuit decided Mountain States 
Legal Foundation v. Costle.164 There, the Tenth Circuit considered a 
plaintiff’s challenge to a Clean Air Act provision granting the Environ-
mental Protection Agency authority to approve or disapprove of Colo-
rado’s clean air policies.165 The court held that under third-party stand-
ing principles, the Tenth Amendment claim belonged to the state and 
could not be raised by a private party.166 The court determined that the 
plaintiff lacked standing because Colorado state law required that, 
unless a divergence is granted, only the attorney general may enforce 
the state’s interests.167 More than twenty years later, in 2004, the Tenth 
Circuit decided the case of United States v. Parker, where the petitioner 
had been found with a loaded firearm on a public street in violation of 
Utah state law, but the street was on federal land, where the Federal 
Assimilative Crimes Act required state law to be applied.168 Citing Costle 
and TVA, the court ruled that because the petitioner was a private party 
whose interests did not align with the state’s, he could not pursue a 
Tenth Amendment claim.169 The court noted that it would be concep-
                                                                                                                      
160 See infra notes 163–215 and accompanying text. 
161 See infra notes 163–215 and accompanying text. Scholarly writing on private party 
Tenth Amendment standing predates several of the most recent circuit court decisions, 
and the last piece written to advocate private party Tenth Amendment standing was pub-
lished when the permissibility of such standing was still the majority view. See Bechtel, supra 
note 138, at 497; Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1095; David M. Palmer, Note, Untangling 
Tenth Amendment Standing: Why Private Parties Cannot Enforce the Federal Structure, 35 Hast-
ings Const. L.Q. 169, 170 (2008); see also infra notes 163–215 and accompanying text. 
162 See infra notes 163–215 and accompanying text. 
163 Costle, 630 F.2d at 761. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 759. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 762–63. 
168 362 F.3d 1279, 1281 (10th Cir. 2004). 
169 Id. at 1285. 
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tually difficult to assert that a Tenth Amendment violation resulted 
from the federal government’s enforcement of a state law.170 
 Subsequent Tenth Circuit cases have nuanced the Tenth Circuit’s 
position on private party Tenth Amendment standing by placing a cru-
cial gloss on Parker.171 In 2009, the court in United States v. Kueker explic-
itly pronounced what Parker and prior Tenth Circuit decisions post-
Parker had intimated: that the Tenth Circuit’s rejection of private party 
Tenth Amendment standing is not absolute.172 Kueker interpreted Parker 
as denying individuals standing to assert Tenth Amendment claims 
“unless their interests are aligned with the state’s interests.”173 This in-
terpretation did not impact the result in Kueker because the court de-
termined that a party’s interests inherently do not align with those of 
the state when—as was the case there—the federal government action 
being challenged is its enforcement of a state law.174 The decision left 
unresolved, however, how the court will gauge alignment with state in-
terests and suggests, contrary to some other circuit court decisions de-
nying private party Tenth Amendment standing, that state officials 
speaking for the state are not the sole parties who can raise Tenth 
Amendment claims.175 
 In recent years, two other U.S. courts of appeals joined the Tenth 
Circuit in ruling that private party Tenth Amendment standing violates 
the third-party standing bar because the Tenth Amendment does not 
grant rights to private parties.176 These courts also allied with the Tenth 
Circuit in positing a potential exception for private parties whose inter-
ests align with those of the state.177 
 In 2009 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit rejected 
private party Tenth Amendment standing when it decided United States 
v. Bond.178 A defendant convicted of possessing a chemical weapon and 
two counts of mail theft appealed her conviction, arguing that the fed-
eral statute under which she was charged intruded on prosecution of 
                                                                                                                      
170 Id. 
171 See United States v. Kueker, 352 F. App’x 242, 246 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. 
Gibson, 348 F. App’x 392, 395 (10th Cir. 2009); Parker, 362 F.3d at 1281. 
172 See Kueker, 352 F. App’x at 246; Gibson, 348 F. App’x at 395; Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284–85. 
173 See Kueker, 352 F. App’x at 246; Parker, 362 F.3d at 1284–85. 
174 Kueker, 352 F. App’x at 246, 
175 Compare id., with Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234 (recognizing no such excep-
tion for alignment with state interests), and Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34 (same). 
176 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137; Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526. 
177 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137–38; Hacker, 565 F.3d at 527 n.6. 
178 581 F.3d at 137. 
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localized offenses by states, invading federalism boundaries.179 Relying 
on TVA as binding precedent and citing the likelihood of an increase in 
litigation should it hold otherwise, the court determined that the peti-
tioner lacked standing.180 The court held TVA’s position on Tenth 
Amendment standing to be undiminished, rejecting the argument that 
the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in another Third Circuit deci-
sion, the 2003 case of Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, disturbed 
TVA’s binding status.181 The Court had originally granted certiorari in 
Guillen to decide the private party standing question, but eventually de-
cided the case on other grounds; the Bond court saw this as only an in-
dication that at least four justices questioned the binding status of TVA, 
not an indication that TVA was no longer valid.182 The court added that 
denying the appellant standing best comported with the third-party 
standing bar that allows parties only to assert their own rights.183 The 
court concluded its discussion of Tenth Amendment standing by reject-
ing the petitioner’s argument for standing but indicating that it shared 
the Tenth Circuit’s position that the prohibition on private party stand-
ing may not be absolute, and that such standing may potentially be 
permitted if a party’s interests align with those of the state.184 The Su-
                                                                                                                      
179 Id. at 134. The district court denied Bond’s motions, including her federalism 
claims, on the merits and found that the federal act did not violate the principles of feder-
alism because it was enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution in 
compliance with a treaty. See id. at 133. 
180 Id. at 137. 
181 See id.; Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen, 537 U.S. 129, 148 n.10 (2003). 
182 Bond, 581 F.3d at 137; Guillen, 537 U.S. at 148 n.10. 
183 Bond, 581 F.3d at 137. 
184 Id. at 137–38. In a subsequent case the Third Circuit curiously did not invoke its re-
cent holding in Bond. See Berg v. Obama, 586 F.3d 234, 239–42 (3rd Cir. 2009); Bond, 581 
F.3d at 137. In the 2009 case of Berg v. Obama, the Third Circuit dismissed for lack of stand-
ing a claim questioning Barack Obama’s eligibility for the presidency. See Berg, 586 F.3d at 
239–42. Interestingly, the court spent several paragraphs dismantling the petitioner’s claim 
for Tenth Amendment standing without ever invoking the holding in Bond or suggesting 
an inherent lack of standing for private parties raising Tenth Amendment claims. See id.; 
Bond, 581 F.3d at 137. Although the court held the Tenth Amendment irrelevant to the 
case and extensively outlined the petitioner’s lack of concrete injury, it failed to reaffirm 
Bond and dismiss the petitioner’s claim outright. See Berg, 586 F.3d at 239–42; Bond, 581 
F.3d at 137. Whether Berg presents an anomalous case perhaps derived from its unique 
subject matter or a significant refusal to apply Bond is as yet unclear. See Berg, 586 F.3d at 
239–42; Bond, 581 F.3d at 137. A later Third Circuit decision in 2010, United States v. Shen-
andoah, did not cite Bond but did cite other circuit courts in the majority and reaffirmed 
Bond’s holding that private parties lack standing to raise Tenth Amendment claims. United 
States v. Shenandoah, 595 F.3d 151, 161--62 (3rd Cir. 2010). 
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preme Court's recent grant of certiorari now makes this holding subject 
to Supreme Court scrutiny.185 
 In United States v. Hacker, also decided in 2009, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit similarly chose to rely on TVA and follow 
the sudden circuit court movement toward rejecting private party Tenth 
Amendment standing.186 Hacker involved a rather unsympathetic appel-
lant, a convicted child molester, who upon release from prison regis-
tered as a sex offender in Texas.187 After moving several times to various 
states and failing to register as an offender in some states, the petitioner 
was indicted under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
for deliberately traveling in interstate commerce and failing to register 
as a sex offender.188 Among other claims, the appellant charged that 
Congress violated the Tenth Amendment by forcing states to accept reg-
istrations from a federally mandated sex-offender program.189 After 
pleading guilty and preserving his right to appeal, he brought his case 
before the Eighth Circuit, which affirmed the findings below.190 The 
Eight Circuit denied the appellant standing primarily on the strength of 
TVA, despite noting that TVA’s strength had arguably been weakened by 
subsequent Court decisions expanding standing and the substantive 
force of the Tenth Amendment.191 The court added that the third-party 
standing bar prevents a private party from bringing a Tenth Amend-
ment claim because such a party would be relying on the rights ac-
corded to the state by the Tenth Amendment rather than any individual 
rights.192 Although the court declined to decide whether alignment with 
state interests creates an exception whereby private parties may raise 
                                                                                                                      
185 See Bond, 78 U.S.L.W. at 3629 (grant of certiorari). 
186 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526. As the First and Third Circuits noted, the Supreme 
Court’s certiorari decisions convey ambiguous messages, and thus the denial of certiorari 
in Hacker should not be deemed to express the Supreme Court’s agreement with the 
Eighth Circuit’s analysis. See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 35. The Court's 
grant of certiorari in Bond confirms that its denial of certiorari in Hacker is no indication 
that the Supreme Court is uninterested in reviewing a circuit court holding that denies 
private party Tenth Amendment standing. See Bond, 78 U.S.L.W. at 3629 (grant of certio-
rari). 
187 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 523. 
188 Id. 
189 Id. at 524. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 526–27 (quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 252–53 (1998) (noting 
that Supreme Court decisions remain binding precedent until the Supreme Court reviews 
them)). 
192 See id. at 527. 
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Tenth Amendment claims, it noted the Tenth Circuit’s position and did 
not foreclose the possibility of permitting such standing.193 
 Two other federal appeals courts—the First and Second Circuits— 
followed the Tenth Circuit in rejecting private party Tenth Amendment 
standing; these courts primarily based their decisions on the binding 
authority of TVA’s standing analysis, holding that the Supreme Court’s 
discussion of case merits in no way detracted from the force of that 
analysis.194 They also asserted that the New York v. United States Court’s 
description of individual Tenth Amendment rights should not be 
deemed to undermine TVA’s standing statements.195 Neither court 
adopted the Tenth Circuit’s exception for private parties whose inter-
ests align with those of the state.196 
 In 2005 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit issued the 
decision, Medeiros v. Vincent, that ignited the recent trend toward revers-
ing the once-majority position of the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits.197 
Medeiros involved a 1997 amendment to the compact signed by fifteen 
Atlantic states to jointly regulate coastal fishing, a compact made man-
datory by Congress in 1993 in the Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Coopera-
tive Management Act.198 After the amendment placed a limit on the 
quantity of lobsters each vessel could catch daily, the plaintiff was 
criminally charged in 1999 for violating the limit.199 The plaintiff 
sought relief and a ruling that the federal act was an illegal comman-
deering of Rhode Island’s legislative process in violation of the Tenth 
Amendment.200 Citing TVA, the First Circuit held that even if the fed-
eral act violated the Tenth Amendment, as a private party, the plaintiff 
had no standing to bring the claim.201 The Medeiros court considered 
TVA’s Tenth Amendment standing reference to be an alternative hold-
ing to its decision on the case merits—rather than dicta—and one that 
has never been explicitly overruled.202 The court acknowledged New 
York v. United States and its prohibition on states consenting to be com-
                                                                                                                      
193 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 527 n.6. The court determined resolution of the question to 
be unnecessary because the petitioner had failed to even argue that his interests aligned 
with the state’s interests. Id. 
194 See Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234–35; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34. 
195 See Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234–35; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34; see also New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. 
196 See Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 235; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34. 
197 See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34. 
198 Id. at 27. 
199 Id. at 27–28. 
200 Id. at 28–29. 
201 Id. at 34. 
202 Id. 
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mandeered.203 The Medeiros court responded by suggesting that ag-
grieved citizens could resort to the political process to prevent com-
mandeering acquiesced to by the state, and that this, rather than pri-
vate party Tenth Amendment standing, was the remedy New York v. 
United States envisioned.204 Like the Third Circuit, the First Circuit cited 
fears of increased litigation as an additional policy reason to reject pri-
vate party Tenth Amendment standing.205 Also like the Third Circuit, 
the First Circuit dismissed the notion that the Supreme Court’s grant of 
certiorari in Guillen indicated the Court’s desire to permit private party 
Tenth Amendment standing.206 
 After the First Circuit decided Medeiros, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit heard Brooklyn Legal Services Corp. B v. Legal Ser-
vices Corp. in 2006.207 There, a non-profit legal foundation claimed that 
federal restrictions on local legal assistance programs that received fed-
eral funding were unconstitutional for violating the federalism princi-
ples of the Tenth Amendment.208 The Second Circuit pronounced TVA 
binding because it found that TVA’s standing analysis was either an in-
dependent, authoritative rationale apart from its discussion of case 
merits, or else superseded its merits discussion because a court must 
establish jurisdiction and standing prior to considering case merits.209 
The Second Circuit also rejected the notion that New York v. United 
States could upset the precedent established by TVA because New York v. 
                                                                                                                      
203 Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 35; see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182. 
204 See Medeiros 431 F.3d at 35; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182. One 
commentator has raised serious doubts about whether Rhode Island actually acquiesced to 
the federal actions at issue in Medeiros. See Keith Stover, Comment, Restoring the Tenth 
Amendment: A Call to Overrule United States v. Darby and Reinstate National League of Citi-
zens v. Usery, 25 T.M. Cooley L. Rev. 555, 574 (2008). State officials, including the Gover-
nor, objected to some of the federal limits as discriminatory and inept, but were powerless 
to override the federally mandated standards. See id. By the time that the plaintiff violated 
the catch limits, Rhode Island no longer possessed the power to enact its own catch limits, 
but instead was forced into accepting federal regulations. See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 27. 
205 See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 36. 
206 See id. at 35 (positing that the Supreme Court may have granted certiorari merely to 
reaffirm the standing language in TVA in light of a circuit split on the issue). 
207 Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234, aff’g Velazquez v. Legal Servs. Corp., 349 F. 
Supp. 2d 566, 581–83 (E.D.N.Y. 2004). 
208 Id. The district court had granted the plaintiffs standing. Velazquez, 349 F. Supp. 2d 
at 581–83. It had determined that TVA’s standing discussion constituted only cursory dicta 
that was thoroughly undermined by the Supreme Court’s holding in New York v. United 
States that the Tenth Amendment safeguards individuals. See id.; see also New York v. United 
States, 505 U.S. at 181; TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
209 Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234–35 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better 
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in 
any cause.”) (internal quotations omitted)). 
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United States addressed the state’s ability to waive Tenth Amendment 
violations and the Supreme Court never directly confronted the issue 
of private party Tenth Amendment standing.210 
 In 2009 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also en-
tered an opinion on private party Tenth Amendment standing in Ore-
gon v. Legal Services Corp.211 The case did not directly present the ques-
tion of private party standing because the state was the party raising a 
Tenth Amendment claim.212 The court, however, went on to comment 
that only states have standing to allege Tenth Amendment violations, 
endorsing the position that TVA is binding precedent.213 The Ninth 
Circuit’s position is seemingly dicta that had no direct bearing on the 
matter before the court; nonetheless, it indicates the Ninth Circuit’s 
inclination to join the majority position of U.S. courts of appeals and to 
join the First and Second Circuits in the strictest interpretation of TVA, 
that only a state may raise a Tenth Amendment claim.214 Furthermore, 
in 2010 the Ninth Circuit issued an unpublished memorandum deci-
sion that characterized Legal Services Corp. as establishing the “settled 
law of this circuit” that only states have Tenth Amendment standing.215 
C. Other Circuit Court Analysis of Tenth Amendment Standing 
 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has also 
commented on private party Tenth Amendment standing; although the 
court has avoided definitively deciding the issue, it has contributed 
some important analysis of the question.216 In the 2002 case Lomont v. 
O’Neill, the D.C. Circuit declined to decide the broad question of Tenth 
Amendment standing for all private parties, deeming the inquiry un-
                                                                                                                      
210 See id. at 236. The court also acknowledged that Supreme Court precedent subse-
quent to TVA has arguably weakened the Court’s statement about standing in TVA. See id. 
211 552 F.3d at 972. 
212 See id. Discussing quasi-sovereign jurisdiction, the court noted that “[i]nterests of 
private parties are obviously not in themselves sovereign interests, and they do not become 
such simply by virtue of the State’s abiding in their achievement. In such situations, the 
state is no more than a nominal party.” Id. (quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto 
Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 601–02 (1982)). 
213 See id. The practical result of the court’s decision was that an alleged injury was left 
remediless. See id. at 972–73. Under the court’s ruling, the private party claiming injury 
had no Tenth Amendment standing to bring the claim and the state of Oregon, the only 
party that could have Tenth Amendment standing, lacked any injury. See id. 
214 See Legal Servs. Corp., 552 F.3d at 972 n.3; see also Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 
234; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 34. 
215 Stop the Casino 101 Coal. v. Salazar, Nos. 09–16294, 09–16297, 2010 WL 2530721, 
at *2 (9th Cir. June 3, 2010). 
216 See Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
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necessary because it upheld the grant of standing to two law enforce-
ment officer plaintiffs.217 The court interpreted Printz v. United States as 
implicitly granting Tenth Amendment standing to law enforcement of-
ficers, because the Supreme Court had decided the case on the merits 
without questioning the officers’ standing to bring the claim.218 The Lo-
mont court further rejected the government’s attempt to put a gloss on 
Printz that would read it as only permitting standing when the officers 
are authorized to act on behalf of the state, and instead held it to en-
dorse law enforcement officer Tenth Amendment standing absolutely.219 
 In a footnote, the Lomont court discussed the broader question of 
standing for all private parties and observed that Supreme Court cases 
after TVA have severely undercut the decision’s discussion of Tenth 
Amendment standing as interpreted by the current majority of circuit 
courts.220 The court tempered that analysis, however, by quoting the 
Supreme Court’s 1989 holding in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/ Ameri-
can Express, Inc. that, “If a precedent of this Court has direct application 
in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly 
controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own de-
cisions.”221 Lomont contributes to the notion—advanced even by some 
of the circuit courts declaring TVA to be binding—that subsequent Su-
preme Court decisions, such as New York v. United States, have undercut 
the position that Tenth Amendment standing should be denied to pri-
vate parties.222 It also stands for the important proposition that in Printz 
the Supreme Court has already expanded Tenth Amendment standing 
beyond the state and its authorized representatives.223 
III. Permitting Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing  
Is Consistent with TVA and Supreme  
Court Standing Doctrine 
 The evolution of the standing doctrine and the fluctuating devel-
opment of Tenth Amendment jurisprudence make it difficult to deci-
                                                                                                                      
217 See id. at 13–14. 
218 See id; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904, 933 (1997); supra notes 61–
66 and accompanying text. 
219 See Lomont, 285 F.3d at 13 (citing Printz, 521 U.S. at 898). 
220 Id. at 14 n.3. 
221 Id. (quoting Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989)). 
222 See id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181–82; Hacker, 565 F.3d at 527. 
223 See Lomont, 285 F.3d at 13–14; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933. 
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pher the Supreme Court’s stance on the question of private party 
Tenth Amendment standing.224 A collective look at how the Court has 
dealt with standing and the Tenth Amendment, however, shows that a 
careful reading of the Supreme Court’s 1939 decision in Tennessee Elec-
tric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) and other Court prece-
dent mandate a vindication of private party Tenth Amendment stand-
ing.225 The Supreme Court’s TVA decision is not binding precedent in 
regard to private party Tenth Amendment standing and was never in-
tended to be such, as circuit court analysis of TVA reaffirms.226 Freed 
from the yoke of TVA, the Court should permit private party Tenth 
Amendment standing when it decides United States v. Bond, because the 
Tenth Amendment protects individual rights, not merely those of the 
states.227 The text of the Tenth Amendment and the Court’s interpreta-
tion of the Amendment both recognize that private parties bring Tenth 
Amendment claims on the strength of their own rights—not those of 
the states.228 With no Court precedent and no valid standing bar left 
obstructing private party reliance on the Tenth Amendment, the fed-
eral courts and the Supreme Court should recognize private party 
Tenth Amendment standing; at the very least, the Supreme Court 
should for the first time conduct a comprehensive exegesis of the 
Tenth Amendment in relation to private party standing.229 
A. The Supreme Court Did Not Intend TVA to Establish Binding Precedent on 
Tenth Amendment Standing 
 Principles of judicial review and standing demonstrate that TVA 
did not establish a binding precedent prohibiting private party Tenth 
Amendment standing.230 Likewise, prior Supreme Court precedent 
makes it unlikely that TVA was intended as a landmark case rejecting 
private party Tenth Amendment standing.231 The language and specific 
                                                                                                                      
224 See supra notes 36–122 and accompanying text. 
225 See Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 144 (1939); Helvering 
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937); see 
also infra notes 228–278 and accompanying text. 
226 See infra notes 230–278 and accompanying text. 
227 See infra notes 279–310 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Bond, 581 
F.3d 128, 137 (3rd Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 78 U.S.L.W. 3629 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. 09-
1227). 
228 See infra notes 279–310 and accompanying text. 
229 See infra notes 279–328 and accompanying text. 
230 See infra notes 234–239 and accompanying text. 
231 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 
585; see also infra notes 240–244 and accompanying text. 
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facts of TVA similarly make such an intention unlikely.232 On the con-
trary, other decisions of the Court provide an alternate implicit prece-
dent embracing private party Tenth Amendment standing.233 
 The TVA Court’s cursory statements regarding Tenth Amendment 
standing cannot be deemed authoritative because of the foundational 
principle of judicial review that a court may not hear a case over which 
it lacks jurisdiction.234 If the TVA Court had in fact authoritatively ruled 
that the appellants lacked standing simply because they brought a 
Tenth Amendment claim as private parties, then the Court would have 
had no cause—and in fact, no jurisdiction—to decide that under the 
Tenth Amendment the federal action in question was not a regula-
tion.235 The TVA Court, however, preceded its brief one-sentence com-
ment on Tenth Amendment standing with a determination of the case 
on the merits, an exercise in futility and abuse of jurisdiction if its sub-
sequent comment regarding standing was meant to be binding.236 
 Those opposing private party Tenth Amendment standing argue 
that even in light of the Court’s discussion of the merits, the Court‘s 
denial of standing absent state involvement is a second, equally authori-
tative holding.237 The Supreme Court, however, is not subject to any 
higher court of review and would have no reason to discuss the merits 
as a second basis for its opinion should its so-called Tenth Amendment 
holding be rejected—no court has the power to reject a holding of the 
Supreme Court.238 Additionally, even if this stance could conceivably 
explain the Court’s discussion of the case merits, it does not account 
for the shift in precedent that a mere sentence without a word of ex-
planation in TVA would enact if it actually prohibited all private party 
Tenth Amendment standing.239 
 Prior to deciding TVA, the Supreme Court had already implicitly 
upheld private party Tenth Amendment standing at least twice within 
                                                                                                                      
232 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; see also infra notes 234–264 and accompanying text. 
233 See infra notes 260–264 and accompanying text. 
234 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 101–02 (1998); see also TVA, 
306 U.S. at 144. 
235 See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 101–02; TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; see also Gershengorn, supra 
note 35, at 1073. 
236 See 306 U.S. at 143–44. 
237 See Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp B. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 235 (2d Cir. 
2006); Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 34 (1st Cir. 2005); Palmer, supra note 161, at 183. 
238 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 
(1989). Further, if the Court made an authoritative decision denying standing it would 
have no jurisdiction to continue further and offer an alternative holding. See Steel Co., 523 
U.S. at 101–02. 
239 See infra notes 240–244 and accompanying text. 
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the previous two years.240 Thus, if TVA were intended to be authorita-
tive it would not only have established binding precedent on a complex 
question of constitutional law and judicial review, but also would have 
directly overturned recent Court practice to the contrary.241 It is im-
probable that the Supreme Court would take such major steps in a cas-
ual sentence embedded deep within an opinion rich with discussion of 
case facts, and do so without acknowledging the implicit precedent 
from the cases merely two years prior that it would be overturning.242 
 In fact, the Court makes no reference to its prior cases granting 
the type of standing TVA purportedly rejects.243 On the contrary, one of 
those cases, the Court’s 1937 decision in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 
was cited multiple times by the ultimately victorious appellees.244 
 Even if the standing statement in TVA was authoritative, it was ap-
plicable only to the parties in the case at hand; the language of TVA is 
narrow and case-specific, not sweeping and indicative of the dawning of 
a new, contrary precedent.245 TVA neither mentions the past practice of 
granting the type of standing that it would be rejecting nor the new 
standing limits it would be enacting in all cases henceforth, but instead 
speaks only of the specific appellants in the case before it.246 
 The best reading of TVA is that the Court denied the appellants’ 
right to bring the case absent state involvement because the private 
party appellants were only tangentially impacted by the federal ac-
tion.247 Further, the appellants suffered no personal, concrete harm to 
their rights because the incorporation granted to the private compa-
nies by the various states in which they operated promised no exclusiv-
ity or monopoly of the market.248 The states, by contrast, had statutes in 
place mandating that the state had the authority to establish and to 
regulate utilities within the state.249 It was thus the states’ rights as ex-
pressed in these statutes that were potentially infringed by the federal 
                                                                                                                      
240 See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 585. 
241 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 
585. 
242 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 
585. 
243 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144; see also Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 
585. 
244 TVA, 306 U.S. at 130, 131; Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 585. The appellees’ arguments 
are reproduced in the U.S. Reports version of the TVA decision. 306 U.S. at 130. 
245 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
246 See id. 
247 See id. at 139, 144. 
248 See id. at 139. 
249 See id. at 140. 
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act establishing a power-producing entity within their borders. This is 
not because that is what the Tenth Amendment and standing doctrine 
require in all Tenth Amendment cases, but rather because that is what 
the facts dictated in that specific case.250 The TVA Court’s brief standing 
comment makes contextual sense read as a narrow observation on the 
case at hand—a case where the states could demonstrate concrete in-
jury to a right they possessed but the private parties could not—rather 
than as a sweeping precedent intended to still bind the courts over six 
decades later.251 
 The narrow scope of TVA’s standing discussion is confirmed by 
Justice Butler’s dissenting opinion, which argued not on Tenth 
Amendment interpretation grounds, but with case-specific facts.252 His 
dissent argued not that the Tenth Amendment permits private parties 
to raise Tenth Amendment claims absent state participation, but that 
the private electric companies complained of a unique and concrete 
harm that under the circumstances of the case was not a generalized 
grievance and did constitute an infringement of rights.253 The dissent-
ing opinion provides further evidence that the issue of contention in 
TVA was whether the private parties had suffered sufficient harm to a 
cognizable right, not whether a private party could raise a claim under 
the Tenth Amendment.254 
 Notably, TVA was also decided in 1939, a time when the Supreme 
Court pendulum was in the midst of swinging back toward a non-sub- 
stantive view of the Tenth Amendment, a view that did not survive the 
Court’s 1992 decision in New York v. United States and similar cases.255 In-
stead, the Supreme Court’s implicit grant of standing to the CLEOs in 
the 2000 case of Printz v. United States demonstrates the Court’s ongoing 
                                                                                                                      
250 See id. at 144. Without further elaboration drawn from TVA as to why, one commen-
tator characterizes TVA’s holding as only prohibiting a private party from asserting a state’s 
right, but allowing a private party to assert his own rights in bringing a Tenth Amendment 
claim. See Bechtel, supra note 138, at 491. 
251 See supra notes 124–223 and accompanying text. 
252 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 152 (Butler, J., dissenting). 
253 See id. 
254 See id. 
255 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992); see supra notes 42–66 and ac-
companying text. Although Darby was not decided until 1941, Professor Chemerinsky iden-
tifies 1937 as the year when the Supreme Court reverted to viewing the Tenth Amendment 
as lacking substantive force. See Chemerinsky, supra note 8, at 313. Decided in 1939, TVA 
came down in the midst of a period marked by the Court’s reticence to recognize rights 
flowing from the Tenth Amendment. See id.; see also TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
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practice dating back to Steward Machine Co. of granting private parties 
standing in Tenth Amendment cases.256 
 Those rejecting private party Tenth Amendment standing point to 
the fact that TVA has not been overturned as evidence of its ongoing 
precedential force.257 It is true that the erosion of time in and of itself 
does not erode the weight of precedent and that such precedent re-
mains case law until the Supreme Court pronounces otherwise.258 Such 
an argument, however, relies for all its force on the doubtful logical 
underpinning that TVA ever was binding on the question of Tenth 
Amendment standing.259 Additionally, as much as TVA has never been 
explicitly overturned, neither have the 1937 cases of Helvering v. Davis 
and Steward Machine Co.260 Given the weak case for considering TVA 
binding authority,261 those two earlier cases, joined with the modern 
Printz decision, arguably present the strongest, albeit implicit, Supreme 
Court precedent on private party Tenth Amendment standing.262 
Which precedent definitively demands adherence has been undefined, 
as even at least four justices on the Supreme Court acknowledged when 
they granted certiorari in 2003 to Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen to 
try to answer that very question.263 Although Supreme Court precedent 
does not unquestionably state the propriety of private party Tenth 
Amendment standing, it does imply it, and certainly does not serve as a 
strong reason for rejecting it.264 
B. Implicit Undermining of the Claim that TVA Is Binding Precedent 
 Further reasons to doubt TVA’s binding force ironically come from 
some of the very circuit courts that deny Tenth Amendment standing 
chiefly on the strength of TVA.265 The 2009 decision by the U.S. Court 
                                                                                                                      
256 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 904, 933 (2000); Steward Machine Co., 301 
U.S. at 585. In Printz standing was implicitly granted to law enforcement officials. See 521 
U.S. at 904, 933. 
257 See, e.g., United States v. Hacker, 565 F.3d 522, 526–27 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 302 (2009); Lomont v. O’Neill, 285 F.3d 9, 13 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Rod-
riguez, 490 U.S. at 484); Palmer, supra note 161, at 183. 
258 See, e.g., Lomont, 285 F.3d at 14 n.3 (quoting Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 484). 
259 See id.; see also supra notes 230–256 and accompanying text. 
260 See Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co., 301 U.S. at 585. 
261 See supra notes 230–256 and accompanying text. 
262 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933; Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Steward Machine Co., 301 
U.S. at 585. 
263 See 537 U.S. 129, 148 n.10 (2003); see also Bond, 581 F.3d at 137 (noting the signifi-
cance of the grant of certiorari in Washington). 
264 See supra notes 230–263 and accompanying text. 
265 See infra notes 266–278 and accompanying text. 
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of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Hacker noted that 
“before reaching the merits of Hacker’s Tenth Amendment argument, 
we must ensure that he has standing to raise the argument.”266 The 
court then went on to rest its ruling on TVA, a case where the Court 
reached the merits of the plaintiff’s Tenth Amendment claim.267 This is 
something that the Court would not have done—by the Hacker court’s 
own reasoning—if TVA had in fact ruled definitively that the plaintiff, 
as a private party, did not have standing to bring a Tenth Amendment 
claim.268 The circuit courts’ interpretation of TVA as authoritatively re-
jecting private party Tenth Amendment standing is thus undermined 
by the reasoning of the courts themselves when they refuse to entertain 
the merits of a Tenth Amendment claim because they have determined 
the plaintiff to lack standing.269 
 Furthermore, the Third and Tenth Circuits’ conceptualization of 
narrow private party Tenth Amendment standing in cases where the 
party’s interests align with those of the state270 abandons TVA’s lan-
guage.271 If actually binding precedent, TVA left no exception for pri-
vate party standing when in alignment with state interests, but instead 
conditioned that the private corporations needed to bring the claim in 
conjunction with state officials.272 The circuit courts envisioning this 
limited private party standing not only invite the nightmare of a vague 
and subjective inquiry into when a party’s interests can be said to align 
with the state’s, but also disregard TVA in a way sharply juxtaposed with 
those same circuit courts holding TVA as sacrosanct precedent when 
they use it as the chief basis to deny private party Tenth Amendment 
standing.273 
 The recent trend among U.S. courts of appeals toward denying or 
limiting private party Tenth Amendment standing resulted almost en-
tirely from their perception of TVA as binding precedent.274 Although 
                                                                                                                      
266 565 F.3d at 525. Some other circuit courts denying private party Tenth Amendment 
standing also acknowledged this principle. See, e.g., Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234; 
Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 33. 
267 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 526–27. 
268 See id. at 525–27. 
269 See id.; see also Brooklyn Legal Servs., 462 F.3d at 234; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 33. 
270 See supra notes 171–185 and accompanying text. 
271 See TVA, 306 U.S. at 144. 
272 See id. Alignment with state interests arguably existed in TVA since the private par-
ties sought to enforce a state statute. See id. at 140. That position is weakened, however, by 
the states’ policies and laws implemented to facilitate the federal action that the TVA plain-
tiffs were disputing. See id. at 141. 
273 See supra notes 171–193 and accompanying text. 
274 See supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
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some courts have identified policy reasons supporting a denial of such 
standing,275 not one has made an independent argument apart from 
any reference to TVA as to why private party Tenth Amendment stand-
ing must be denied.276 The trend toward denying such standing be-
speaks not any independent analysis that could illuminate the Supreme 
Court’s imminent review, but merely a parroting of the dicta in TVA.277 
No court now in the majority position has independently analyzed the 
constitutional and prudential considerations surrounding private party 
Tenth Amendment standing, and this is where the Supreme Court, un-
yoked from TVA, should begin.278 
C. The Tenth Amendment Protects Individual Rights and Private Party Claims 
Do Not Violate General Standing Doctrine 
 The Tenth Amendment was intended to protect private party 
rights, as evinced by the text of the Amendment and the decisions of 
the Supreme Court.279 Thus, granting private party standing in Tenth 
Amendment claims does not violate the third-party and generalized 
grievance standing bars.280 Without TVA as binding precedent, the fed-
eral courts are free to engage in their role of constitutional interpreta-
tion.281 Principles of constitutional interpretation show that the Tenth 
Amendment should be read as safeguarding individual rights, not 
merely those of the states.282 Proponents of private party Tenth 
Amendment standing identify the 1992 Supreme Court decision in New 
York v. United States as the seminal modern case delineating the con-
tours of the Tenth Amendment.283 In New York v. United States the Su-
preme Court reaffirmed its 1991 decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft that the 
Tenth Amendment is a substantive limit on the power and actions of 
the federal government and highlighted individuals as the specific in-
tended beneficiaries of the protections conferred by the Tenth 
                                                                                                                      
275 See Bond, 581 F.3d at 137 (citing fear of increased litigation); Medeiros 431 F.3d at 36 
(same). 
276 See supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
277 See supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
278 See supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. 
279 See infra notes 287–310 and accompanying text. 
280 See infra notes 287–310 and accompanying text. 
281 See supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text; infra notes 287–310 and accompa-
nying text. 
282 See infra notes 287–310 and accompanying text. 
283 See infra notes 296–310 and accompanying text. 
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Amendment.284 Private parties with personal, particular harms should 
be able to bring a Tenth Amendment claim asserting their own per-
sonal rights.285 Finally, private parties raising Tenth Amendment claims 
can receive redress for their injuries.286 
1. The Text and Structure of the Tenth Amendment Demonstrate That 
Its Scope Protects Private Parties 
 The text of the Tenth Amendment supports the interpretation 
that the Amendment was designed to safeguard individual liberty and 
to secure rights to private parties, not merely to states.287 The Amend-
ment’s reservation of rights “to the States respectively, or to the people” 
would have its closing clause “or to the people” rendered a nullity were 
the Court to rule that only states have rights and standing to raise 
claims under the Amendment.288 Reading “to the people” as just an-
other way of repeating “the States” gravely offends the principle that no 
clause in the Constitution “is intended to be without effect.”289 
 Based on historical data, there is strong reason to believe that “to 
the people” is most accurately read as granting individuals the right to 
enforce state sovereignty.290 First, both those framers in favor and op-
posed to the Tenth Amendment held the belief that it was the people 
                                                                                                                      
284 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181; Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 
(1992); see also infra notes 296–310 and accompanying text. 
285 See infra notes 296–310 and accompanying text. 
286 See infra notes 311–328 and accompanying text. 
287 See U.S. Const. amend. X; supra notes 288–295 and accompanying text. 
288 Bechtel, supra note 138, at 496. Throughout the Constitution, the phrase “the peo-
ple” is used to demark individual rights of the people. Kevin Jones, Comment, Reframing 
the Tenth Amendment Debate: Drawing Cultural Theory from the Holster, 77 UMKC L. Rev. 487, 
493 (2008). Additionally: 
[T]he Tenth Amendment clearly implies a difference between the two terms 
[“states” and “the people”] by using the word “States” twice and “the people” 
once in a distinguishable fashion. The use of both terms in the same amend-
ment illustrates that the drafters of the Constitution did not use the terms in-
terchangeably, but rather had separate meanings for each. 
Id. at 494. 
289 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803); Bechtel, supra note 138, at 
496; see also United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94–95 (1947) (de-
termining that civil servants have political rights and freedoms under the Tenth Amend-
ment). In contrast to other aspects of the Tenth Amendment, the phrase “to the people” was 
adopted without debate or disagreement. Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1085–86. The most 
supported interpretation of this phrase is that it indicates that the people were the actual 
holders of the rights conveyed by the Amendment. Id. at 1086. 
290 See Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1086–87; see also supra notes 67–74 and accom-
panying text. 
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as individuals who retained the rights not granted to the federal gov-
ernment.291 Additionally, the Tenth Amendment concludes the Bill of 
Rights portion of the Constitution that was inserted for the protection 
of individual liberties.292 Because the dual-sovereignty notion of federal-
ism embedded in the Tenth Amendment exists to prevent tyranny, it 
must protect the rights of individuals, the parties who would be the vic-
tims of such tyranny.293 
 The language of New York v. United States also strongly supports the 
interpretation that places the people as the primary intended benefici-
aries of the Tenth Amendment’s protections.294 Because individuals pos-
sess Tenth Amendment protections in their own right, those private par-
ties raising Tenth Amendment claims sue to enforce their own rights.295 
                                                                                                                      
291 See Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 1085–86. References to the rights of “the peo-
ple” were frequently used at the time of the Founding to connote individual rights. See 
Kates and Cramer, supra note 67, at 1350 n.68. The Founders, including James Madison, 
made early references to the right to assemble, the right to freedom of religion, and the 
right to freedom of speech in terms of rights belonging “to the people.” See id. 
292 See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 70 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). 
293 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181–82; Bechtel, supra note 138, at 497. It 
makes logical sense that the Tenth Amendment protects individual rights because when 
the federal government oversteps its bounds and encroaches on the states, it is not the 
state, but its citizens who suffer. Bechtel, supra note 138, at 497; Gershengorn, supra note 
35, at 1095. 
294 See 505 U.S. at 181–82. Professor Erin Ryan criticizes the Court’s decision in New 
York v. United States for creating an “inalienability rule” regarding the Tenth Amendment. 
See Ryan, supra note 67, at 7–8. She argues that by assigning the Tenth Amendment’s pro-
tections to the individuals within a state–-and not just the state itself—the Court created a 
bad policy whereby the state’s metaphorical hands would be tied in negotiating intergov-
ernmental partnerships. See id. See generally Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming Jan. 2011). Notably, although Ryan expresses concern for the policy implica-
tions of New York v. United States, she never doubts the Court’s meaning that the Tenth 
Amendment exists to protect individual rights. Ryan, supra note 67, at 7–8, 41. Ryan de-
scribes the decision as analogizing private parties’ rights under the Tenth Amendment to 
other Bill of Rights protections enjoyed and enforced by private parties, like the right to a 
jury trial or the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See id. at 41. 
295 See Ryan supra note 67, at 7–8, 41. But see McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 
3020, 3084 n.20 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating as an aside that the Ninth and 
Tenth Amendments, along with the Establishment Clause, do not guarantee individual 
rights); District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2790 (2008) (stating in dicta that 
although the framers used the phrase “the people” to connote individual and not merely 
collective rights, the Tenth Amendment is not a rights-granting amendment, but instead 
one that reserves powers). 
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2. Private Parties Can Raise Tenth Amendment Claims on the Strength 
of Their Own Rights and Personal Injuries 
 The permissibility of private party Tenth Amendment standing is 
the result that logically flows from the Court’s pronouncement in New 
York v. United States that individuals are protected by the Tenth Amend-
ment.296 If the Tenth Amendment protects individual rights, then indi-
vidual private parties with particularized harms may bring a Tenth 
Amendment claim on their own rights, thus rendering moot any al-
leged violation of the third-party standing bar.297 Although the disputed 
federal government action may not directly regulate the private party, 
the private party may nonetheless be granted standing under the Lujan 
v. Defenders of Wildlife and Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental 
Services model, cases decided by the Supreme Court respectively in 1992 
and 2000.298 Applying the reasoning of Lujan and Laidlaw, the Tenth 
Amendment violation needs only a sufficient nexus to the plaintiff’s 
injury for standing to be granted.299 Thus private parties should be able 
to bring Tenth Amendment claims—in which they invoke a constitu-
tional right intended to protect individuals and not merely states—so 
long as they can demonstrate a personal, concrete harm.300 Losing 
                                                                                                                      
296 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. 
297 See supra notes 75–100 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the taxpayer suit standing 
analysis the Court developed in 1968 in Flast v. Cohen does not apply to parties raising Tenth 
Amendment claims derived from personal, concrete injuries. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina 
Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78–79 (1978); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102, 105–06 
(1968). Whereas the Flast-type plaintiff brings a generalized grievance claim grounded solely 
in his or her status as a taxpayer, under New York v. United States the private party Tenth 
Amendment plaintiff with distinct, personal injury brings a claim derived from his or her 
personal rights granted by the Tenth Amendment. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 
181; Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 78–80; Flast, 392 U.S. at 105–06. 
298 See Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 183 (2000); Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563–64 (1992). 
299 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64; Bechtel, supra note 138, at 495. 
300 See Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 183; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. As in FEC v. Akins, standing 
should be recognized because there exists a constitutional protection (a federal statute in 
the case of Akins) designed to protect the plaintiff from just the sort of harm alleged---here 
the encroachment of the federal government on state sovereignty to the detriment of the 
individuals living in the states, a harm that the Court in New York v. United States pro-
nounced that the Tenth Amendment protects against. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 
(1998); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. Even if the Lujan and Laidlaw precedents 
are viewed as confined to environmental cases, New York v. United States, Printz, and Reno v. 
Condon would still provide precedent for expanding Tenth Amendment protection by 
which the Court would likely recognize the private party’s Tenth Amendment standing 
claim. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141, 151 (2000); Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933; New York 
v. United States, 505 U.S. at 157, 181; Bechtel, supra note 138, at 495; see also Laidlaw, 528 
U.S. at 183; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 563–64. 
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one’s job, being sent to prison, and being indicted for the size of a lob-
ster catch seem to all present cases of personal, distinct, and concrete 
harm that, if sufficiently linked to a Tenth Amendment violation, 
should result in standing.301 
 Although some would-be plaintiffs attempting to raise Tenth 
Amendment claims may lack personal, particularized injury and may 
merely be asserting a generalized grievance, that standing obstacle is a 
product of the specific facts of the case, not of an overall principle that 
all Tenth Amendment claims are generalized grievances that do not 
particularly harm private parties or implicate individual rights.302 Op-
ponents of private party Tenth Amendment standing characterize the 
bar against generalized grievances established by the Supreme Court’s 
1923 decision in Frothingham v. Mellon as further evidence of the Court’s 
rejection of private party Tenth Amendment standing.303 In Flast v. 
Cohen in 1968, however, the Supreme Court noted that the Frothingham 
plaintiff’s fatal flaw was that she sought to assert the states’ interest in its 
legislative prerogatives, rather than her own interests as a taxpayer or 
any personalized injury distinct from all other taxpayers.304 In light of 
the Constitution’s text and New York v. United States, private parties may 
suffer distinct harms to their individual rights when the Tenth 
Amendment is violated—it remains for a trial court to determine if 
such distinct injury has occurred in a given case.305 
 In New York v. United States, the Court additionally ruled that a state 
may not surrender its sovereign power, even should it wish to do so.306 
Thus, circuit courts that permit private party standing exclusively for 
states or parties raising claims in alignment with state interests errone-
                                                                                                                      
301 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 524; Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 28; Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 
185 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 1999). 
302 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181; Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 78–80; TVA, 
306 U.S. at 144. 
303 See Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 479–80, 487 (1923); Palmer, supra note 
161, at 182 (arguing that Frothingham, Flast and their progeny support the principle that “a 
state and a state alone must assert its own rights”). 
304 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 105. Though Flast did not explicitly link its ban on generalized 
grievances absent fulfillment of the nexus requirement with a prohibition of private party 
Tenth Amendment standing, the structure of the opinion suggests that the Court may 
have made such a link. See Palmer, supra note 161, at 182. Such a link is untenable, how-
ever, given the Court’s pronouncement in New York v. United States that the Tenth Amend-
ment safeguards individuals. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. Under New York v. 
United States, the Tenth Amendment does not just protect states’ rights—general and un-
differentiated for all citizens, but personal rights subject to distinct, personal harm. See id.; 
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 78–79. 
305 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. 
306 See id. at 181–82. 
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ously weigh the opinion voiced by the state.307 Under New York v. United 
States, the only question that matters is whether the federal government 
infringed on the state’s sovereignty, with or without the state’s con-
sent.308 It matters not that Utah would not have argued the same posi-
tion as the plaintiff in United States v. Parker, only that the plaintiff bring-
ing his claim had distinct personal injury and was objecting to a 
violation of the state’s sovereign rights.309 When private parties suffer a 
particularized injury that is distinct from the rest of the population— 
and thus not a generalized grievance—then under the Tenth Amend-
ment as interpreted by New York v. United States, that party may raise a 
claim not as a third-party plaintiff invoking the rights of the state, but as 
an individual invoking his or her own rights.310 
3. Private Party Tenth Amendment Standing Satisfies the Redressability 
Prong 
 A private party claim under the Tenth Amendment can be re-
dressed.311 If a federal action were struck down pursuant to a private 
party Tenth Amendment claim, the private party would be freed from 
the existence of the injurious federal action, and the states, no longer 
constrained by the federal action, would be free to enact their own 
policies suited to their own citizens’ needs and demands.312 Absent the 
permissibility of private party Tenth Amendment standing, injured pri-
vate parties, including even some state officials, are denied a remedy 
from the courts.313 
 In analyzing the 2005 U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
case Medeiros v. Vincent, one commentator has correctly asserted that, in 
order to bring a Tenth Amendment commandeering claim, a state gov-
ernment must suffer commandeering at the hands of the federal gov-
                                                                                                                      
307 See id.; see also Bond, 581 F.3d at 137; United States v. Parker, 362 F.3d 1279, 1285 
(10th Cir. 2004). The Medeiros court suggests that the Supreme Court’s ban on a state’s 
consent to commandeering in New York v. United States is satisfied by the political process—
citizens aggrieved by the consented-to commandeering will seek to change it. See supra 
notes 203–204 and accompanying text. Providing an additional remedy, however, by which 
state consent to commandeering can be remedied—the political process—does not justify 
considering such consent, which the Court in New York v. United States pronounced to be 
irrelevant. See 505 U.S. at 182; supra notes 168–193. 
308 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182. 
309 See 362 F.3d at 1284–85; see also Bechtel, supra note 138, at 493. 
310 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181; Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 78–80. 
311 See infra notes 316–326 and accompanying text. But see Palmer, supra note 161, at 193. 
312 See infra notes 316–320 and accompanying text. 
313 See infra notes 321–328 and accompanying text. 
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ernment.314 The commentator goes on to argue, however, that because 
the relief for commandeering would be to strike down the federal 
law—allowing the state the freedom to do as it pleased—the plaintiff 
would only taste relief if the state were to repeal its own law that con-
sented to the federal law, making effective redress unlikely.315 
  This view is faulty, however, because it assumes that Rhode Island 
had consented to and agreed with the lobster quantity limits imposed 
by the federal act at issue in Medeiros.316 All that Rhode Island actually 
consented to, however, was a compact entered into decades earlier 
(and later made involuntary by federal law) whereby the Atlantic states 
would join together in overseeing the oceans by using interstate fishery 
management plans.317 In many other potential Tenth Amendment 
claims, the state has not consented to the federal action at all.318 If re-
leased from the federal plan mandates, Rhode Island officials may very 
well respond to the state’s own needs and voter interests by creating a 
different catch limit or abandoning limits altogether.319 It is unclear 
whether the plaintiff’s every grievance would immediately be redressed, 
but it is certainly not sound to presume that he would receive no relief; 
at the least, the plaintiff would receive satisfaction by the removal of the 
federal mandate enforcing the catch limits and the opening of the way 
for him to lobby his local leaders for reform.320 
 It is also false to assume that when the claim involves the comman-
deering of a state executive apparatus, no harm is done by denying pri-
vate party standing.321 This view assumes that the ones most harmed by 
commandeering are state officials who would be able to bring a claim 
in conjunction with the state attorney general—who, speaking for the 
state, would have standing.322 It is doubtful, however, that the state offi-
cials directly harmed would have standing to raise their claims in in-
stances when the state and its attorney general disagreed with them, 
unless private parties have Tenth Amendment standing.323 Had the po-
                                                                                                                      
314 Palmer, supra note 161, at 193; see also Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 33. 
315 Palmer, supra note 161, at 193. Using Medeiros to illustrate, Palmer explains that 
even were the federal act to be struck down, the plaintiff would have no relief unless the 
state decided to change its lobster catch limits. See id. 
316 See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 27. 
317 See id. 
318 See Hacker, 565 F.3d at 524–25; Printz, 521 U.S. at 904. 
319 See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 27, 33; Stover, supra note 204, at 574. 
320 See Medeiros, 431 F.3d at 27, 33; Stover, supra note 204, at 574. 
321 See infra notes 323–325 and accompanying text. But see Palmer, supra note 161, at 194. 
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D.C. Circuit, law enforcement officials would be granted standing regardless of whether or 
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sition of the CLEOs in Printz been contradicted by the state, they would 
fail to meet the standing requirements outlined by the currently-
prevailing view among circuit courts.324 Private parties (both state offi-
cials and ordinary citizens) directly and personally harmed by the fed-
eral government’s commandeering would be left without remedy, and 
the Court’s command in New York v. United States that states may not 
consent to being commandeered would be thwarted.325 
 In order to effectuate the ruling in New York v. United States, TVA 
should not be construed as prohibiting private party Tenth Amendment 
standing because the Court’s one-sentence standing commentary comes 
after the Court’s discussion of case merits and makes the most contex-
tual sense as referring only to the parties of that case.326 The Supreme 
Court’s decision in New York v. United States, coupled with the text and 
structure of the Tenth Amendment, demonstrate that the Tenth 
Amendment grants rights to individuals, and not only states.327 Private 
parties suffering distinct, particularized injuries deserve standing be-
cause they raise Tenth Amendment claims on the strength of their own 
rights and are not third-party plaintiffs invoking the states’ rights.328 
Conclusion 
 The Tenth Amendment guards state sovereignty but can only be 
given its intended power, as defined by the most recent expressions of 
the Supreme Court, when individual citizens and private parties are 
allowed to enforce it. The Court’s 1939 decision Tennessee Electric Power 
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority cannot be used as a precedential bar to 
private party Tenth Amendment standing because the Court’s discus-
sion of standing is cursory dicta, particular to the facts of that specific 
case, that has been outmoded by the Supreme Court’s new emphasis 
on the Tenth Amendment and on its protection of individual rights. 
The third-party and generalized grievance bars are not automatically 
applicable to bar private party Tenth Amendment standing because 
                                                                                                                      
not they have been authorized to act on the state’s behalf. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904, 933; 
Lomont, 285 F.3d at 14 n.3. 
324 See 521 U.S. at 904, 933; supra notes 160–215 and accompanying text. The same 
would hold true in the hypothetical at the start of this Note. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 904; see 
also supra notes 1–7, 160–215 and accompanying text. 
325 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 182; see also Gershengorn, supra note 35, at 
1088. 
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history, text, and Supreme Court precedent indicate that the Tenth 
Amendment protects individual rights. The Supreme Court should re-
solve the growing circuit split in its forthcoming decision in United States 
v. Bond, to bring harmony to the courts over such a fundamental issue 
as standing, and should permit private parties to raise Tenth Amend-
ment claims when they demonstrate distinct, personal harm. 
Katherine A. Connolly 
